

# Air Force Materiel Command

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*Developing, Fielding, and Sustaining America's Aerospace Force*

## **The Macro Dynamics of Weapon System Acquisition: Shaping Early Decisions to Get Better Outcomes**



**U.S. AIR FORCE**

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*Integrity - Service - Excellence*

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# Challenges

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- Defense acquisition is already broken
  - Systems Engineering – event driven vs effects based
  - Reduced Capacity – “procurement holidays” increase cycle time and costs
  - Complexity – A&D community self inflicted wound
  - Requirements – not necessarily connected to mission, physical reality, affordability, and ability to deliver on time
- Reduced budgets are a fact of life
  - Fewer acquisition new starts
  - Reduced infrastructure, reduced capacity
  - Not if or when, but how much
- Over the next decade the US could lose technological superiority, economic competitiveness in key areas
- We have to get past policies to systemic root causes to overcome pending reductions and increase the output of the US Aerospace and Defense industry



# Key Systems Engineering Leverage Points

## Marked by Events – Mired by Lack of Effectiveness



AFMC

GAP      MDD


A

B


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1. 75% LCC fixed @ MS A



2. Technology Maturity @ MS B



3. Design Closure @ CDR

Materiel Solution Analysis (MSA)

Technology Development (TD)

Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD)



Production and Deployment (P&D)

O&S

Root Cause

Discovery

6. Suitability



5. IOT&E Pause Test Rate


4. Late Defects



# Top Line Economic Model

## Understanding Impact of Reduced Capacity

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Final number of systems actually delivered driven by:

- Overruns
- Congressional or DoD dictates
- Final Budget constraints


$$\text{Fraction of Systems Actually Delivered} = 1 - \frac{\text{RDT\&E Overrun} + \text{Proc Overrun} - \Delta \text{Budget}}{1 - \text{RDT\&E Budget}}$$

**RDT&E Budget fraction amplifies the RDT&E and Procurement overruns plus Budget changes!**



# RDT&E Fraction of the DoD Acquisition Budget

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# Macro-Dynamics of Acquisition

## Moving From Symptoms to Systemic Causes

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- Acquisition output impacted by RDT&E Fraction of acquisition costs


$$\text{Fraction of Systems Actually Delivered} = 1 - \frac{\text{RDT\&E Overrun} + \text{Proc Overrun} - \Delta \text{Budget}}{1 - \text{RDT\&E Budget}}$$

- Discrete jumps in RDT&E Fraction align with “Procurement Holidays” – not a general increase attributable to complexity

- Fundamental dynamic cycle –
  - At onset of each period, procurement decreases but RDT&E stays constant because of backlog
  - At end of each period, procurement increases and so does RDT&E because of new starts added to backlog

- Correlating causative factor –
  - Capability and capacity of system reduced at beginning of each cycle but not rebuilt during the ascending end of the cycle – bathtub effect, more RDT&E coming in but less going out

**Acquisition system has passed a tipping point leading to pathological firefighting**





# Doesn't Matter Which Way the Budget is Headed

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- Declining Acquisition Budget
  - Reduced capacity, capability, intellectual capital
  - Programs already in development continue with less capacity for development
- Increasing Acquisition Budget
  - Increase in new starts added to programs already in development
  - Capacity, capability, and intellectual capital not increased to meet new demand


Both scenarios lead to a mismatch between capacity and demand leading to *pathological firefighting* for all programs



# Simple Dynamic Model


## Effect of Reduced RDT&E Capacity

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- Simple sinusoidal Proc \$ with 20 yr period , \$90B±\$30B
- Baseline RDT&E \$ expended at 0.25 Acq \$
- With perfectly balanced, infinitely elastic capacity RDT&E \$ would stay at 0.25 Acquisition \$


- Reduced capacity consistent with previous chart
  - -15% in 70's,
  - constant in 80's @ 85%,
  - further reduced 25% in 90's
  - constant in 00's @ 60%
- Replicates major trends, Total RDT&E \$ and RDT&E Fraction escalate after each cycle






# Complexity A Self Inflicted Wound?

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Runaway cycle time not inherent to added complexity

- Architecture choices
- Processes
- Process ownership
- Lack of Accountability



Aerospace industry rampant with late defects and rework


- Design tools and processes
- Lack of feedback to key design and SE processes
- Lack of quantified risk and uncertainty at key decision points



# Impact of Reduced Capacity and Increased Complexity

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90's-00's  
70's-90's  
50's-70's



◆ Next Gen Fighter?

Orange indicates current estimate

Time to First Flight

First Flight to IOC

Average Time to IOC


Complex Systems + Reduced Capacity/Capability → Long Development Cycle



# Requirements Setting

Robust, Resilient Design Vice Single Point Optimum Solution

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
# Coupling Operability, Interoperability, and Physical Feasibility Analyses – a Game Changer

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## Simulator

- Discrete Event Simulation
- Real Time
- High Resolution Time – Space Visualization
- Event Engineering Models
- Table Look Ups

## Comm Models




## L-V-C Interface



## Operational Modeling

- Discrete Event Simulation, Agent Based Modeling
- < Real Time
- Scenario Visualization
- Event Engineering Models
- Table Look Ups



**Common Interface  
Built on Reducing  
Physics Models to  
Light Weight Algebraic  
Relations**


## Physics Modeling

- Discretized Physics
- > Real Time
- Phenomena Visualization



# Integrating M&S, RDT&E, and Statistical Engineering for Life Cycle Support

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*A Continuum of Tools Underpinned with Statistical Engineering  
to Quantify Margins and Risks at Key Decision Points*



# Early Decisions for Better Outcomes

## Better Tools and Processes Applied Earlier

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- Systems Engineering – event driven vs effects based
  - Quantified margins/uncertainties at key decision points, particularly MS A/B
  - Accountability for risk management
- Reduced Capacity – “procurement holidays” increase cycle time
  - Increase effective capacity by reducing total workload and late defect discoveries through better design tools and technical process changes
- Complexity – aerospace/defense community self inflicted wound
  - Platform based engineering, common architectures for most software systems vice clean sheet approach
  - Increases in complexity have to “buy” their way onto the system during the requirements setting phase, including impact on acquisition cycle time
- Requirements – not necessarily connected to mission or physical reality
  - Integrated wargames, flight simulators, and physics-based modeling support early insertion of physical reality into operational assessments and cost/risk projections
  - Resilient system designs for flexibility to meet changing missions

# A Final Thought from Winnie-the-Pooh

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*It is, as far as he knows,  
the only way of coming  
downstairs,  
but sometimes he feels  
there really is another way,  
if only  
he could stop  
bumping for a moment  
and think of it.*